Gender Stereotypes, Political Leadership, and Voting Behavior in Tunisia

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Abstract

Although female political representation in the Arab world has nearly doubled in the last decade, little is known about how voters in the region view female politicians and their political platforms, particularly in a new democracy like Tunisia. We conduct original conjoint and vignette survey experiments to examine the effects of candidate gender and gender- and leadership-congruent political platforms on voter support. Building on role congruity theory, we find evidence of bias against female candidates among voters, particularly among respondents who hold patriarchal gender norms. Additionally, we find that all respondents are more likely to prefer candidates who emphasize security issues rather than women's rights. Overall, our study suggests that female candidates who emphasize issues congruent with stereotypes of political leadership, such as security, can increase voter support, though respondents also reward male candidates who appeal to leadership congruent issues.

Keywords: Tunisia, political representation, elections, women, gender

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Mehrezia Labidi, a prominent female politician and leader within the main Islamist-leaning political party in Tunisia, Ennahda, recounted a particularly memorable experience during the Constituent Assembly debates for the new Tunisian constitution. Labidi was trying to regain control of a plenary session she was chairing and told a male politician, who had been demanding the floor, to wait and respect the process. Appalled, the man retorted: "Respect? I have no respect for you, you are a woman." According to Labidi, "He [the male politician] thought I could not chair the session, just because I was a woman" (UN Women 2012).

Although the politician later apologized, the incident illustrates the types of political challenges that women in the public sphere face. These attitudes are not limited to the Middle East. Studies of the United States have long documented gender discrimination in social, political, and corporate leadership (Carli and Eagly 2001; Eagly and Karau 2002). Despite similar backgrounds, women are consistently ranked lower than their male counterparts, often perceived as being less competent (Carli et al. 1995), less influential (Altemeyer and Jones 1974), less likable (Carli 1991), and less powerful (Carli and Olm-Shipman 2000). This gender discrimination persists even though women are more likely to exhibit democratic leadership styles (Eagly and Johnson 1990) and are less likely to be corrupt (Esarey and Chirillo 2013).

In an effort to explain why women in leadership positions face such challenges, social psychology research emphasizes the significance of role congruence. Pioneered by Alice Eagly, role congruity theory posits that positive (negative) evaluations of individuals or groups are based on whether they affirm (defy) societal expectations (Eagly 1987). Importantly, role congruity theory highlights the double bind of social roles for female politicians: trying to adopt a successful public profile for a stereotyped social role, like political office, while facing gender stereotypes that push in the other direction.

While some may view Mehrezia Labidi's experience as simply an unfortunate political re-

ality, there is a growing body of research that examines the strategies that female politicians adopt to counter gender-based bias.[1] These have produced mixed results. Indeed, there is evidence in favor of women employing gender congruent strategies in pursuit of leadership positions in order to avoid punishment for transgressing gender norms (Eagly and Steffen 1984; Kunda and Oleson 1997). However, Bauer (2017) finds that women employing leadership congruent strategies are able to improve potential voters' perception of their leadership traits by conforming to the social norms associated with success in a leadership position.[2]

To better understand the challenges female candidates face regarding social norms, this article asks two questions: (1) Do female political candidates in Tunisia face gender bias? (2) Does a gender congruent political platform increase support for female politicians, or does a platform congruent with stereotypes of political leadership increase support?

We examine the case of Tunisia to shed light on these questions. The majority of studies on role congruity, gender stereotyping, and political leadership are conducted in the United States; thus, it remains unclear how role congruity theory applies in a comparative context. Due to the perception that Islamic societies rely heavily on traditional gender roles, one might expect gender norms to be stronger in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. However, Tunisia is generally recognized as one of the most progressive countries in the MENA region with regard to women's rights, both in terms of formal legal institutions and civil society activism.

More importantly, Tunisia is an important case as politicians and policy-makers establish new electoral norms and laws in the country's current period of democratic consolidation.

[1] We conceptualize a political platform as the issue areas on which the politician focuses and campaigns. Indeed, both a candidate's experience and issue platform are used as a political tool to discredit female candidates (Murray 2008) or are used by female political candidates seeking to engage in counter stereotypical messaging (Cryer 2018).

[2] The mixed findings in the literature on gender in politics can be attributed to a variety of factors. First, within the research that uses an experimental approach, leadership qualities are often operationalized in different ways. Moreover, in much of the discourse concerning support for female candidates, voters often cite an additional reason for why women do not receive the vote: the gendered differences in the candidates' political experience or policy areas (Eddy 2013; PEW 2015).

Notably, while the post-revolution electoral quotas for female candidates provide significant institutional support for female candidates, women remain underrepresented in the national parliament and on key parliamentary commissions, such as those that address defense and security. These gender gaps highlight the need to understand voters' views of female political candidates.

Using survey experimental methods, we find evidence that female political candidates face bias related to their gender identity. As we might expect, this bias is concentrated among respondents with patriarchal values. However, female candidates gain additional political support when they run on a platform that is congruent with leadership roles (e.g., security). This increase is shared across respondents with gender egalitarian and patriarchal values. Comparable male candidates, however, also experience increased political support when they appeal to a leadership congruent platform.

The experimental results support an interpretation of role congruity theory in which a preference for a candidate who emphasizes leadership issues is shared broadly, but patriarchal respondents, in particular, express a strong preference for male candidates and reward men for running on leadership congruent political platforms. This research highlights how individual-level gender attitudes interact with candidate gender identity and gendered issue areas.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows. First, we summarize role congruity theory and present our hypotheses. In the second section, we present background information on Tunisia, illuminating the relationship between gender and politics in the country. In the third section, we outline the research design, sample properties, and measures of voter support. Next, we present our results. To conclude, we review the significance of our findings and discuss the implications for future research and for policies regarding political representation and women's rights in the Middle East.

Role Congruity Theory

In this article, we examine how gender norms, candidate gender identity, and gendered political platforms affect voters' support for a political candidate. There are several explanations for the persistent gap in political representation between men and women, including a lack of institutional support (Jones 2009; Krook 2009), economic factors (Ross 2008), and patriarchal gender norms (Alesina et al. 2013). Tunisia, a country with progressive and strictly enforced gender quotas, is an ideal case to examine the degree to which patriarchal gender norms are still operative in a context with substantial formal institutional support for women (Shalaby 2014).

We draw on theories in social psychology and political communication, specifically role congruity theory, to hypothesize about the relationship between candidate gender, gendered political platforms, and voters' support. Role congruity theory posits that "a potential for prejudice exists when social perceivers hold a stereotype about a social group that is incongruent with the attributes that are thought to be required for success in certain classes of social roles" (Eagly and Karau 2002: 574). In other words, negative evaluations of a female political candidate can occur when the woman: (1) conforms to the stereotyped gender role but fails to meet the societal expectations of a leadership role or (2) conforms to the stereotyped leadership role but fails to meet the societal expectations of her gender role. Research on gender roles and leadership indicates that leadership roles are associated with stereotypically male characteristics of agency, assertiveness, and toughness. Accordingly, for women, leadership congruent roles are often synonymous with gender incongruent roles, and we use the two terms interchangeably throughout this article.

With regard to political leadership, this theory can generate two competing (and directly opposing) expectations: (1) women may be punished for having stereotypical female attributes that are not congruent with expectations of successful leadership, or (2) women

can be punished for having stereotypical leadership (typically masculine) characteristics that are not congruent with female gender roles. Moreover, voters' gender attitudes can interact with candidate gender and gendered political platforms in distinct ways.

The evidence on role congruity is mixed. For instance, Garcia-Retamero and López-Zafra (2006) find that individuals who adopt leadership congruent strategies are at a disadvantage, Herrnson et al. (2003) argue that gender issue ownership can help female candidates, and Fox and Oxley (2003) find that women are more likely to run for political offices that are perceived as gender congruent. Conversely, Dolan (2010), Holman et al. (2011), and Bauer (2017) find that those candidates who employ leadership congruent strategies can improve voters' perceptions.[3] To explicate the various ways that role congruity could operate in the Tunisian context, we present a set of hypotheses below.

Hypotheses

We examine the two competing interpretations of role congruity theory. In a context in which political leadership is strongly associated with men and masculine traits, one interpretation of role congruity theory stresses that a candidate should align with the stereotypes associated with the role or job that they are pursuing. Some scholarship shows that male candidates, when compared with female candidates, are more likely to be categorized as political leaders because of the association between maleness, masculinity, and leadership skills (Eagly and Karau 2002; Koenig et al. 2011; Vinkenburg et al. 2011).

In accordance with this view, one hypothesis is that female candidates whose political platform or issue areas are congruent with more masculine traits may be better positioned to gain political support.[4] By making appeals to experiences and issues stereotypically

[3]Since existing research provides support for both interpretations of role congruity theory, more recent research has looked explicitly at how the domestic political context or the issue areas that candidates emphasize alter the expectations of how role congruity theory operates across distinct contexts (Holman et al. 2016; Lawless 2004).

[4]This is what we refer to as the leadership congruent or gender incongruent strategy.

associated with political leadership, female political candidates will be able to signal that they possess the traits stereotypically associated with political office. Indeed, previous studies have revealed that women who present themselves as feminine and traditional were perceived to be less competent than women who presented themselves as less traditionally feminine. Dolan (2010) finds that individuals' support for a female candidate is largely contingent on whether the female candidate is perceived to be competent in traditionally male domains, such as security. Bauer (2017) finds that female candidates that adopted counter-stereotypic gender strategies were able to improve perceptions of their leadership characteristics. This leads us to our first hypothesis:

H1: **Female candidates whose political platform is congruent with stereotypes of strong leadership are more likely to gain increased political support:**

> Expectation: Candidate profiles that appeal to security issues to gain higher political support than those who appeal to women's issues.

Conversely, an alternative interpretation of role congruity theory suggests that a candidate should align with the stereotypes associated with their gender in order to not be perceived as transgressing established gender norms. Previous research has found that when a female candidate employs rhetoric that is incongruent with female stereotypes, constituents are more likely to sanction her and less likely to offer her political support (Falbo et al. 1982; Javornisky 1979).[5] As such, voters are more likely to support male candidates who address issues related to security and foreign policy, while they are more likely to support female candidates who address issues of health and education (Herrnson et al. 2003; Meeks 2012; Rosenwasser et al. 1987; Sapiro 1982). This interpretation of role congruity theory posits that when a female candidate emphasizes policies that are gender congruent, such as women's issues or education, constituents are more likely to reward her.

[5]Bauer (2017) finds this effect among non-co-partisans.

Why might this be the case? Research shows that women perceived as agentic and assertive are punished for behaving in ways incongruent with stereotypical expectations of women (Eagly and Steffen 1984). Some research suggests that women who appear more agreeable and communal are preferred, especially when advancing stereotypically feminine positions (Carli et al. 1995; Eagly and Johnson 1990). Accordingly, this interpretation of role congruity theory would suggest that women whose political platform was gender congruent with female stereotypes would fare better than women who decided to emphasize leadership congruent issue areas. Thus, an alternative hypothesis to H1 is:

H2: **Female candidates whose political platform is congruent with stereotypes of women are more likely to gain increased political support:**

> Expectation: Candidate profiles that appeal to women's rights to gain higher political support than those who appeal to security issues.

Thus far, we have focused on the general effects of candidate gender and candidate platform. Role congruity theory also posits that the effects of role congruity will be most pronounced among those respondents who endorse traditional gender roles because those individuals are more likely to differentiate between the social roles that are appropriate for men and women. Empirically, while social norms regarding gender and leadership roles are socially determined and widely shared within a community, there is significant subnational variation in the degree to which individuals hold the gender stereotypes that undergird role congruity theory (Alesina et al. 2013; Alexander and Andersen 1993; Dolan 2010; Glaeser and Ma 2013). It is not clear, however, whether gender norms interact with candidate gender and gendered issues areas in distinct ways.

We expect that the effect of candidate gender and gendered issue areas will be most pronounced among those respondents with patriarchal gender attitudes. *Patriarchal* types will prefer candidates who are male and emphasize issues associated with stereotypes of

leadership, such as security issues. Returning to H1 and H2 above, however, it is not clear whether these patriarchal types will prefer women who adopt leadership congruent issue areas (security) or gender congruent issue areas (women's rights). For *Egalitarian* types, we expect that they will be indifferent between male and female candidates and that they will not differentially prefer a male candidate over a female who emphasizes the same issue. This leads to our third hypothesis:

H3: **Respondent beliefs about gender norms (*Patriarchal* or *Gender Egalitarian*) will moderate the effects of candidate gender and political issue areas.**

Gender and Politics in Tunisia

We explore these questions of bias facing female politicians in Tunisia for several reasons. Although the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is often portrayed as highly patriarchal with regard to gender norms (Fish 2002; Ross 2008), Tunisia is typically viewed as progressive in terms of women's rights both in the MENA region and globally (Brand 1998; Charrad 2001; Murphy 2003). Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia's first president, introduced several reforms related to women's rights, including the 1956 Personal Status Code that gave women and men equal rights with regard to divorce, established minimum ages for marriage, and banned polygamy (Tessler et al. 1978a, 1978b).[6] Figure 1 demonstrates that, compared to other North African countries, Tunisians are less likely to agree with the statement that men are better politicians than women.[7]

Importantly for our purposes, Figure 1 also indicates that there is significant individual-level variation in the preference for male politicians in Tunisia. This divide regarding a

[6]In addition to these legal changes, the state established the *Union nationale de la femme tunisienne* (UNFT), or the National Union of Tunisian Women, expanded educational opportunities for both men and women, and included some female candidates on the dominant political party's electoral lists.

[7]Figure A.1 in the Appendix displays the levels of female political representation across North Africa between 1997 and 2017.

Figure 1: Attitudes on Gender and Political Leadership in Comparative Perspective



Source: Arab Barometer, Wave 4.

preference for male political leadership follows a long history in which women's rights and gender equality were front and center in the country's political debates both among elites and at the grassroots level. For instance, Charrad (1997; 2001) argues that Tunisia's early commitment to women's rights was the result of political competition and strategic considerations among the Tunisian elite rather than bottom-up activism by women's organizations. However, particularly following the popular uprising in 2010, grassroots activism has also played a central role in foregrounding gender equality issues. Charrad and Zarrugh (2014) argue that the 2010 revolution in Tunisia ushered in a new era of gender politics in the country, moving the country from a 'politics from above' to 'politics from below'.[8]

In addition to increased civil society activism, Tunisia ratified a new constitution and electoral laws in 2014 that mandated that 50 percent of political candidates on all electoral lists must be women.[9] Specifically, the electoral law required that each list have vertical parity between male and female candidates, a practice of alternating between male and female candidates in the list order also known as the 'zipper' system. This law, however, has not translated into gender parity within the elected assembly. In the elections for the National Constituent Assembly in 2011, women made up between 27 and 30 percent of the 217-member assembly and were the heads of only 7 percent of all electoral lists.[10] After the

[8]They document this shift by focusing on the rise of a more vibrant civil society and public sphere in Tunisia following the uprising, noting the diverse, grassroots women's organizations involved in contentious debates on the issue of women's rights and the controversial Article 28 of the country's constitution. Article 28 of Tunisia's new constitution, which guarantees the rights of Tunisian women, originally contained language in an early draft that referred to women as 'complementary' to men. This reference was later removed.

[9]The electoral laws also included list quotas for youth (individuals under 40) and disabled persons. See: Government of Tunisia (2014, 2017) for the full electoral laws. The vertical parity requirement was in place for the National Constituent Assembly elections in 2011. For the 2018 municipal elections, the government strengthened the quota law by requiring horizontal parity as well. Under this requirement, parties or movements competing in more that one municipality were required to have female heads for half of their lists.

[10]The exact number of female deputies varies over the five-year electoral cycle based on which MPs are selected to serve in the cabinet and how that cabinet changes. When an elected MP is selected to serve in the cabinet, the next person on the electoral list replaces him or her. This means that the number of female MPs is subject to change based on cabinet appointments and reshuffling. For more on the 2010-2011 uprising and voting behavior in Tunisia's 2011 and 2014 elections, see: Anderson (2011); Berman and Nugent (2015); Chomiak and Entelis (2011); and Lefèvre (2015).

2014 parliamentary election, women constituted between 31 and 35 percent of the members of the country's national parliament, the Assembly of the Representatives of the People (ARP) and headed almost 12 percent of all electoral lists.[11]

In interviews conducted in July 2017, we asked several female MPs and civil society leaders about how gender shapes the experience of female politicians in Tunisia. Broadly, most identified the same four obstacles facing female politicians: (1) insufficient access to financing (specifically relative to their male counterparts); (2) hesitancy on the part of party elites to make women the heads of electoral lists; (3) challenges balancing political life with familial responsibilities (and a lack of institutional support to address issues of work-life balance); and (4) conservative social norms regarding the public role of women.[12] While the country's electoral laws — such as those requiring gender parity on electoral lists — directly address some of the structural and institutional obstacles, this study seeks to directly address the fourth concern (gender norms), with the view that obstacles (1) through (3) are exacerbated by these same gender norms.[13]

Despite the implementation of gender quotas, many female politicians share a concern that social norms continue to limit women's public roles.[14] Several of our interviewees emphasized the importance of gaining experience in public life prior to entering government, particularly given the increased scrutiny that women in the political sphere often face. Souad

[11]In 2014, 68 women were elected (31.3 percent of the ARP), but 72 women were seated because several men were selected as ministers (National Democratic Institute 2015). The number of women in parliament increased with subsequent cabinet reshuffling.

[12]It is worth noting here that most interviewees emphasized that these conservative norms are not exclusive to the members or supporters of only one particular party, but transcend partisan affiliation. In addition, issues (1) and (3) tend to be categorized as supply-side challenges, while (2) and (4) are viewed as more demand-side obstacles (Paxton et al. 2007).

[13]For an example of a recent study that examines the impact of a women's quota on political actors' changing electoral strategies, see Bush and Gao (2017). The authors argue that gender quotas create incentives for political actors to nominate women, especially in cases when the political groups are relatively small or weak, and the quota increases their group's likelihood of success.

[14]Interestingly, a recent study by Bush and Prather (2018) found that voters were less likely to contact their representative when primed to think of a mixed gender group of politicians rather than a group of only female politicians, which the authors attribute to a preference for gender segregation among religiously conservative voters.

Bayouli of the Popular Front Party previously worked with the Tunisian General Labor Union (*Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail*, UGTT); that experience, she said, "helped her to adjust to public life" as an elected deputy.[15] Similarly, Bochra Bel Hadj Hmida, who was elected as an MP with Nidaa Tounes in 2014, was an activist with the Tunisian Association for Democratic Women for many years and was engaged in several public policy campaigns to advance women's rights and combat violence against women during the Ben Ali regime.[16] Heger Bouzemmi, an MP with Ennahda who was only in her mid-twenties when she was elected in 2014, became interested in public service through her involvement and leadership in Tunisia's Scouts program.[17]

Notably, such formative experiences in public and associational life are often difficult for potential female political candidates to acquire, particularly in certain policy spheres, such as those related security and defense. Riadh Bachoucha of the Independent High Authority for the Elections (*L'Instance Supérieure Indépendante pour les Élections*, ISIE) emphasized that, in addition to the subset of highly educated, politically active women, there is a substantial number of women who would like to participate as candidates but need additional training on how to be empowered both in their political parties and as elected officials because of their limited experience in such a public role.[18] Among candidates for the 2018 municipal election, the female candidates were less likely to have previously participated in a demonstration or municipal council meeting and were less likely to be members in unions and other professional organizations (Clark et al. 2018).

[15] Author interview and translation (with Souad Bayouli), July 5, 2017.

[16] Author interview and translation (with Bochra Bel Hadj Hmida), July 14, 2017.

[17] Author interview and translation (with Heger Bouzemmi), July 18, 2017.

[18] Author interview (with Riadh Bachoucha), July 4, 2017. The gender gap exists for voter turnout and other measures of general political participation as well. Though 46 percent of registered voters were women in 2014 (Gahler 2014), women are less likely to vote (Arab Barometer 2016). Additionally, women are less likely to attend campaign rallies and meetings, with only 4 percent of women reporting attending such events during the 2014 elections compared to 19 percent of men (Arab Barometer 2016). Across North Africa, a gender gap also extends to key political attitudes, such as trust in political institutions and beliefs about the neutrality of those institutions (Buehler 2016).

In addition, the challenges faced by women within political parties represent another important example of how social norms continue to limit the role of women in the political sphere. While political parties are more open to female members now compared to prior to the revolution, there is still a gendered glass ceiling whereby women often do not have access to the parties' most powerful positions, both within the party apparatus and on the electoral lists. MP Samia Abbou of the Democratic Current stated that, despite the progress since 2011, parties frequently use women as "decoration" or simply to fill the women quota slots on the electoral lists without fully including women in the party or elevating women to serve as heads of lists.[19] Moreover, Abbou emphasized that parties exist within a social context in which it is hard to attract female candidates. Many women who want to engage in politics fear the increased scrutiny and demands on their time that accompany a public political role.

Accordingly, Tunisia is an ideal case to study the question of gender bias in the MENA region because the implementation of electoral gender quotas has been successful in increasing the visibility of many female politicians affiliated with parties from across the political spectrum. At over thirty percent, Tunisia has the highest percentage of women in parliament in the MENA region (World Bank 2018).[20] As a result, Tunisian voters have significant exposure to a wide range of female politicians, meaning our experimental treatments will have ecological validity.

Moreover, despite these structural and institutional mandates, women remain underrepresented in local councils, parliament, and the cabinet, and are often marginalized when they do hold formal roles in the government.[21] Tunisia affords us a unique opportunity to

[19] Author interview and translation (with Samia Abbou), July 18, 2017.

[20] Between 2012 and 2016, Algeria also had over 30 percent female representation in the national parliament, but with cabinet changes, Tunisia's female representation in parliament was typically higher at roughly 35 percent.

[21] Women make up 47 percent of local council representatives despite strict vertical and horizontal parity laws aimed at increasing women's representation to 50 percent. Women represent less than 20 percent of municipal council heads (mayors) (BabNet 2018).

gauge differing public attitudes on female politicians at a time when gender in politics is both salient and consequential. This is a critical next step in understanding the remaining barriers to women in the political sphere (Shalaby 2014).

Research Design

By focusing on different political issue areas, we are able to adjudicate between the two different interpretations of role congruity theory in the Tunisian context. We operationalize these ideas in our experimental design in two ways. In the conjoint experiment, we randomize the candidates' gender identity, as well as four different political priorities a candidate can advance: improving security, improving women's rights, improving the economic situation, and combating corruption. In the vignette experiment, we manipulate the policy areas that potential political candidates can emphasize: improving security, improving women's rights, and preserving traditional values. We selected these issue areas because of their importance in Tunisia and because we could assign a gendered valence to them.

Selecting Political Priorities

The first issue area — security — is viewed as a traditionally male domain. Previous research has found that men are associated with or exert greater influence over issues areas related to gun control or military while women exert greater influence over issue areas like education and child care (Falbo et al. 1982; Provins 2017). Despite Tunisia's overall progressiveness with regard to women's rights (Charrad 2001), the security realm remains largely the purview of men, from the all-male ministers of defense and interior to the male-dominated military.[22] More concretely, Figure 2 displays the percentage of female membership for each parliamentary special commission, with the dashed line indicating the overall percentage of

[22]See: AFP (2016) and Meddeb (2015).

female MPs in Tunisia's Assembly of the Representatives of the People (ARP). Figure 2 indicates that, in the five parliamentary sessions between 2014 and 2019, male MPs are always overrepresented on the Security and Defense commission relative to the other commissions. Thus, Tunisian women working on security issues could be perceived as taking on an issue typically associated with men and masculinity.

Figure 2: Percentage of female MPs on parliamentary special commissions, 2015-2019



Source: Marsad Majles (2019).

The second policy realm — improving women's rights — is traditionally viewed as the domain of women. Improving women's rights is a policy area that clearly draws attention to the gender of the candidate. It is often linked to female politicians and activists; in the

last six cabinets in Tunisia (all of the cabinets since the 2010 revolution), the cabinet post for women's issues has always remained in the hands of female ministers. Moreover, the membership of Tunisia's special parliamentary commission for women and family issues is overwhelmingly female (Figure 2).

In the vignette, we also include a third issue area: the preservation of Islamic culture and traditions, which we consider to be gender neutral. While in Tunisia most religious leaders are male, women are often viewed as active leaders within the cultural realm.[23] Moreover, in many countries worldwide and across the Middle East, women are viewed as key actors in the maintenance of cultural traditions and social norms (Ahmed 1992; Mahmood 2005).[24] We select this as the third issue area for the vignette in order to contrast an issue area that has more progressive connotations (women's rights) with an issue area that has more conservative connotations, even if it is less clearly gendered.

In the conjoint, we include issue areas related to the economy and corruption in order to understand how security and women's issues are viewed relative to economic concerns. For the vignette, we leave aside these economic issues because they are the most important issues in Tunisia currently and there is little real-world variation as all politicians stress these economic issues. Accordingly, in the vignettes, we focused on the secondary issues that a candidate could focus on.[25] The vignettes for each of these policy areas are included in the Appendix.

[23]The view of women as cultural leaders is not consistent across space or time in Tunisia. As Charrad (1997) writes: "Depending on the political struggles in which it was involved, the political leadership of Tunisia has defined women alternatively as a repository of cultural identity, potential supporters in the quest for modernity, voices to be silenced, or allies against militant Islamic extremism" (p. 286).

[24]Several studies examine the role of female politicians and candidates in Islamist, tribal, or conservative parties in the Middle East (e.g., Bush and Gao (2017) and Clark and Schwedler (2003)). Moreover, research indicates that many women often hold conservative religious or patriarchal views (Blaydes and Linzer 2008).

[25]Economic issues do not have a clear gender valence in the Tunisian context. This mixed view on politician gender and economic issues extends to the United States. Dolan (2010) finds that women and men are evaluated roughly equally on competency measures related to the economy. Provins (2017) shows that — while commerce has a masculine valence — issue areas like labor, employment, welfare, and poverty are perceived as neutral issue areas with no gendered association.

Experimental Design

We embedded two experiments in a household survey conducted by BJKA Consulting Firm in July 2017 (n=1200). Details regarding the sampling methodology are provided in the Appendix. We also conducted a follow-up survey with two similar experiments fielded online by YouGov in April 2019 (n=574). Table A.4 in the Appendix enumerates the survey demographics of our household (BJKA) and online (YouGov) surveys, as well those of the Afrobarometer (2015) and Arab Barometer (2016) surveys.[26]

We designed the survey experiments to test our hypotheses because an experimental approach enables us to isolate the effects of political platform and candidate gender on voter support. Survey experiments are often used in studies of gender to help isolate its effect (Bauer 2017) and are becoming more widespread in the Middle East (Benstead et al. 2015; Bush and Jamal 2015; Masoud et al. 2016).

Measuring Patriarchal Values

In addition to the overall effects, we also present the effects by respondent type: *Patriarchal* and *Egalitarian*. Patriarchal values are typically defined as a system of beliefs that dictate that women are subordinate to men (Bennett 2006), while egalitarianism is defined as "a belief that men and women should attain a certain degree of equality within both public and private realms of society" (McDaniel 2008: 59). We measure respondent type using responses to three questions about gender equality.[27] We asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the following three statements:

[26]Gender, age, education, and employment measures in the household survey are consistent with national averages. The online YouGov sample is younger and more educated than the overall population. These panels have been used in other political science research (e.g., Nyhan and Zeitzoff 2018). Our data and replication files are available at: `https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/HPMEVO`.

[27]We modify the questions on women in society from the third wave of the Arab Barometer and from the sixth wave of the Afrobarometer. These questions are also included in the World Values Survey and used in other studies of gender-based attitudes (McDaniel 2008).

A. In general, men are better political leaders than women.

B. University education for men is more important than university education for women.

C. When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.

We construct a *Patriarchal Attitudes Index*, which increases by 1 for each statement with which the respondent agrees and ranges from 0 to 3. We then categorize all respondents who agreed with two or more statements as *Patriarchal* types. Using this measure, our household survey sample is comprised of 450 *Patriarchal* types (42 percent) and 620 *Egalitarian* types (58 percent), and our online survey sample is comprised of 176 *Patriarchal* types (31 percent) and 398 *Egalitarian* types (69 percent).[28]

Given that this respondent type variable is not randomly assigned, we examine the correlates of patriarchal attitudes. Table 1 displays the results for both the household and online surveys. We find that respondent gender is the strongest correlate of the Patriarchal Attitudes Index. When the respondent is a women, the additive index decreases by approximately 0.6 points.[29] Additionally, education level and previous voting behavior are negatively correlated with patriarchal attitudes in the household survey, and believing religion is of great importance is positively correlated with patriarchal attitudes in the online survey.

[28]We eliminate respondents who respond "Don't Know" or "Refuse to Answer" on all of the patriarchal values questions in the household survey. There is no non-response in the online survey.

[29]This represents a 46 percent decrease relative to the mean of the BJKA sample and a 71 percent decrease relative to the mean of the YouGov sample. The correlation of respondent gender with patriarchal attitudes is in line with earlier research, which shows that men and women view politicians, as well as men and women generally, differently (Hayes and McAllister 1997; McDaniel 2008; Ridgeway et al. 2009). This is not to say that all women share a common conception of women's rights. Recent research by Klar (2018) presents evidence from the U.S. that gender appeals can serve to exacerbate partisan differences between women around the issue of feminism. Khalil (2014) shows similar divides among Tunisian women regarding women's rights. This is also in line with previous research that shows that female respondents are more likely on average to report that they would vote for a women than male respondents (Benstead et al. 2015; Masoud et al. 2016; Sanbonmatsu 2002).

Table 1: Correlates of Patriarchal Attitudes Index

	Dependent variable:			
	Patriarchal Attitudes Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	-0.527^{***}	-0.569^{***}	-0.666^{***}	-0.700^{***}
	(0.076)	(0.082)	(0.090)	(0.101)
Age: 30 to 39	0.061	0.022	0.159	0.162
	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.115)	(0.124)
Age: 40+	−0.030	−0.057	−0.024	0.0001
	(0.117)	(0.121)	(0.118)	(0.125)
Secondary Education+	-0.235^{***}	-0.270^{***}	−0.445	−0.413
	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.309)	(0.326)
Married/Widowed	0.109	0.183^{*}	0.081	0.102
	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.099)	(0.104)
Voted in most recent election	-0.294^{***}	-0.304^{***}	−0.115	−0.114
	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.084)	(0.090)
Unemployed or out of labor force	−0.044	−0.051	−0.073	−0.061
	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.098)
Religion is of great importance		−0.034		0.288^{***}
		(0.102)		(0.099)
Attend prayer daily		0.008		0.174
		(0.105)		(0.146)
Constant	2.207^{***}	2.283^{***}	1.713^{***}	1.386^{***}
	(0.146)	(0.168)	(0.348)	(0.384)
Delegation/City FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample	BJKA	BJKA	YouGov	YouGov
Observations	1,098	1,027	574	506
Adjusted R^2	0.167	0.175	0.117	0.149
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
				Robust SEs

Candidate Conjoint

The first experiment we implement is a candidate conjoint. This conjoint experiment approach contributes to a growing literature in political science that uses conjoint experiments to measure voter response to various candidate traits.[30] Respondents are asked to choose which politician they prefer from two options. With this design, we simultaneously vary eight candidate-level attributes, and, given the randomization of the attributes, can identify the average marginal component effect (AMCE) of each attribute's potential values (Hainmueller et al. 2014). The experiment varies the politician's gender, party affiliation[31], occupation, distance from respondent's hometown, age[32], education level, political priority, and previous government experience.

In the household survey, the respondents view four pairs of candidate profiles, and, in the online survey, the respondents view five pairs of candidate profiles. The order of these attributes was randomized across respondents in order to eliminate concerns about serial position effects.[33] Given this design, we are able to isolate the effect of each factor on voters' support for a potential candidate.

We select a defined range of values for each attribute based on the current composition of the national parliament in Tunisia.[34] We did this as a check on the external validity of our different candidate profiles. Table 2 lists all of the attributes and their associated

[30]For other examples of candidate conjoint experiments, see: Hainmueller et al. (2014); Kirkland and Coppock (2018); Teele et al. (2018); and Ono and Burden (2018) in the United States; Franchino and Zucchini (2015) in Italy; Carnes and Lupu (2016) in Britain, Argentina, and the United States; and Horiuchi et al. (2016) in Japan.

[31]In the BJKA survey, we include Ennahda, Nidaa Tounes, Afek Tounes, Popular Front (Jabha Shabiyya), Free Patriotic Union, Machrouu Tounes, Current of Love, Initiative Party, Democratic Current, and al-Irada Movement. In the YouGov survey, we reduce the included parties to Ennahda, Nidaa Tounes, Popular Front (Jabha Shabiyya), Democratic Current, and an independent candidate list.

[32]In the household survey, the possible ages are 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, and, in the online survey, the possible ages are 33, 42, 51, 60, 71.

[33]Following Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015), however, the order of the attributes does not change within respondent.

[34]We collected information regarding the sex, profession, age, and party of current members of parliament from the Marsad Majles website: `https://majles.marsad.tn/2014/fr/assemblee`. For an illustration of the distribution of MPs' professions by gender, see Figure A.2 in the Appendix.

values. The values of each candidate profile are randomly assigned, and all combinations were permitted.[35]

Table 2: Candidate Attributes and Potential Values

Attributes	Values
Gender	Male
	Female
Party affiliation	Ennahda
	Nidaa Tounis
	Others (listed in fn. 31)
Occupation	Lawyer
	Director of an organization
	Teacher
	Union Activist
	Political Activist
	Employee in the private sector
Hometown	within 10 km of your municipality
	within 20 km of your municipality
	within 30 km of your municipality
	within 40 km of your municipality
Education level	Studied outside of Tunisia
	Bachelors
	Masters
Age	30
	40
	50
	60
	70
Political priority	Improve the economic situation
	Improve security
	Improve women's rights
	Fight corruption
Previous political experience	Has not previously served in the government
	Has previously served in the government

In addition to the candidate attributes, respondents are also assigned to two potential prompts, one that says the election is for the national assembly and one that says the election is for the local municipal council.[36] The prompt reads:

[35]The values are randomized such that the respondent never has to choose between identical profiles and such that the respondent does not see the same pairwise comparison more than once.

[36]There are only 217 seats in the national assembly, while there are 350 municipal councils that vary from 12 to 60 members depending on the population size of the municipality. In our pre-analysis plan, we originally hypothesized that the level of government would impact the degree of support for female candidates (Fox and Oxley 2003; Meeks 2012), but our results do not show significant differences in the impact of politician gender between the municipal and the parliamentary levels, thus we pool the responses. Our pre-analysis

> The Tunisian government is planning to hold [local council elections/national parliamentary elections] soon. [These local councils will set the social and economic development agenda in your region./The national parliament will set the social and economic development agenda in the country.] We would like you to consider two candidates, Candidate 1 and Candidate 2. The table below describes the two candidates' characteristics. Please read the table very carefully, and then tell us which candidate you prefer in the upcoming [local council elections/national parliamentary elections].

The outcome variable, voter support, is measured using the question: If you had to choose, which candidate would you prefer? In the household survey, we include a "Do not prefer either" response option, though it is not read aloud.[37] In the online survey, respondents must select a preferred candidate and cannot respond that they do not prefer either. An example of the experimental prompt in Arabic is included as Figure A.3 in the Appendix.

Candidate Vignette

Our vignette design follows other experimental designs that employ hypothetical vignettes about candidates (Bauer 2015; Huddy and Capelos 2002; Rosenwasser and Dean 1989).[38] In the first vignette experiment embedded in the household survey, respondents are randomly assigned to a security, women's rights, traditional values, or control condition. In each vignette, a fictional candidate, Miriam[39], explains to her potential constituents why they should vote for her. In the three treatment conditions, we manipulate whether Miriam discusses her previous background working in security, women's rights, or Islamic organi-

plan is available at: `http://egap.org/registration/2783`. In the online survey, we alter the prompt to focus just on national elections.

[37]We include this option based on focus group feedback that the forced choice might make people opt out of the survey completely as a result of high political disillusionment and political polarization in the country. In order to address this, we run all conjoint analyses on the subset of people who responded to every set of paired candidates, a group we name the "Always Responders," though the results are robust to using the full sample. In the online survey, we ask: "If you had to choose, which candidate would you prefer as the head of list?" in order to make the question more clear.

[38]Despite concerns about the external validity of hypothetical vignettes (Dolan 2010), this type of experimental approach allows us to isolate the effects of political experience and candidate gender, which, in turn, afford us a high level of internal validity (Morton and Williams 2010; Mutz 2011).

[39]We tested several candidate names through interviews and focus groups to ensure the name "Miriam" was (1) contextually relevant and (2) devoid of any biased economic, political, or socio-demographic associations.

zations. In the control condition, respondents are not given any information on Miriam's previous political background.[40] In the follow-up survey fielded through YouGov in Tunisia, respondents are randomly assigned to a security or control vignette that varies whether the candidate is female (Miriam) or male (Ahmed).[41]

We then ask participants to rate their level of support for the candidate on a five-point scale. This design allows us to cleanly identify the impact of these different political platforms on support for female candidates. Moreover, this design allows us to advance recent scholarship that highlights the importance of gender stereotype (Bauer 2017) and beliefs about leadership ability (Benstead et al. 2015) on attitudes, as we also consider the types of issue areas that can be leveraged to reduce negative attitudes about female politicians.[42]

Results

Experimental and survey research on candidate gender and political support has become increasingly common in political science. Recent research highlights the importance of gender-based stereotypes, and, in particular, the way in which context can change the salience of gender-based stereotypes and how gender-based stereotypes interact with partisanship (Dolan 2010, 2014; Holman et al. 2011, 2016; Sanbonmatsu and Dolan 2009). The existing evidence from candidate conjoint experiments, primarily conducted in the United States and other developed democracies, does not display a consistent overall effect of candidate gender. Teele et al. (2018) and Kirkland and Coppock (2018) find respondents prefer female candidates, Ono and Burden (2018) find respondents prefer male candidates, and Hainmueller

[40]The specific wording of each vignette is available in the Appendix.

[41]We selected Ahmed by looking at the most common males names in the current parliament that appear across party lines.

[42]In our pre-registration plan, we discuss our two measures of voter support: (1) the individual's level of support and (2) the individual's estimate of how much support the candidate will receive within the community. Both are survey measures. We focus on the first measure in this paper because role congruity theory is focused on individual preferences rather than the expectations of the community.

et al. (2014), Carnes and Lupu (2016), and Horiuchi et al. (2016) find no effect of gender. Our research can help make sense of the mixed results produced by candidate conjoint experiments, which typically examine the overall effect of candidate gender by respondent partisanship or respondent gender, rather than by a measure of gender-based attitudes or stereotypes.

Candidate Conjoint

In the household survey conjoint experiment, because we allowed respondents to opt out of choosing between candidates, we subset the data to just those respondents that answered the conjoint question all four times, the "Always Responders."[43] The online survey is a forced choice for all respondents. We use a linear probability model to estimate the average marginal component effect (AMCE).[44]

Across all models, the standard errors are clustered by respondent as an individual's responses are unlikely to be independent of each other across choice tasks. Figure 3 displays the OLS coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals for the Always Responders from the household survey, as well as the OLS coefficients for the *Patriarchal* and *Egalitarian* types. Figure 4 displays the OLS coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals for all respondents in the online survey, as well as the OLS coefficients by respondent type.

[43]Using this method, our sample includes 33.1 percent Always Responders. Women and respondents who report voting in the 2014 elections were more likely to be Always Responders. Few profile traits predict non-response; for instance, having to choose between two female candidates did not cause non-response. However, having to choose between two profiles that both emphasize women's issues does cause respondents to be more likely to say that they do not like either and opt out.

[44]The results are robust to including all responses.

Figure 3: AMCE — Face-to-face survey (BJKA), July 2017



Note: 95 percent confidence intervals displayed.

Figure 4: AMCE — Online survey (YouGov), April 2019



Note: 95 percent confidence intervals displayed.

Both surveys display similar results. Across both surveys, the results indicate a negligible overall effect of candidate gender on voter preference. More importantly, in our subgroup analysis, a negative effect for female candidates is concentrated among respondents with patriarchal values, who are over 7 percentage points less likely to prefer female candidates in both surveys. To provide further evidence of the heterogeneous treatment effect of candidate gender by respondents' gender attitudes, we calculate the marginal means of candidate gender for *Patriarchal* and *Egalitarian* respondents and their difference. Figures A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix display the full set of marginal means for all of the conjoint attributes. These

results indicate that the difference in the marginal means is significant at the 95 percent confidence level for both the household and the online survey.[45]

Turning to candidate platforms, we find that a candidate whose primary policy focus is women's rights is over 10 percentage points less likely to be chosen than a candidate who focuses on security issues, and approximately 20 percentage points less likely to be chosen than candidates who focus on economic issues or corruption. Notably, however, there does not appear to be any difference between *Patriarchal* and *Egalitarian* respondents with regard to how they view candidate platforms, and we find no consistent evidence of an interaction effect between candidate gender and candidate platform.

It could be the case that these findings are driven not by role congruity concerns, but instead by the fact that Tunisians simply are more concerned about security than women's issues. In order to address this concern, at the beginning of our household survey, we ask respondents what the most important issue facing Tunisia today is.[46] We find that approximately 80 percent are focused on economic issues, while only 13 percent choose security issues and 1 percent choose women's issues. The results are robust to subsetting the data to just those respondents who prioritize economic issues.[47] These results indicate that, even among respondents concerned primarily by economic issues, there is a strong dislike for platforms that emphasize women's issues relative to security issues.

Finally, as discussed above, it could be the case that the differences between *Patriarchal* and *Egalitarian* types are driven by other respondent attributes that are correlated with gender egalitarian attitudes. In order to address this concern, we use the residuals from the OLS estimation of the Patriarchal Attitudes Index to generate an additional measure of

[45]This approach follows that recommended by Leeper et al. (2018).

[46]We list ten possible choices: Job creation (502), Improve the economic situation (215), Fight corruption (136), Improve security (127), Improve infrastructure (99), Fight extremism (26), Improve women's rights (13), Strengthen democracy (13), Curb foreign influence (10), and Other (10). We categorize Job creation, Improve the economic situation, Fight corruption, Improve infrastructure as economic issues. Security issues include: Improve security and Fight Extremism.

[47]See Figure A.7 in the Appendix.

patriarchal norms. Respondents with residuals above the median are categorized as *Patriarchal* and those below are categorized as *Egalitarian* types.[48] Figures A.9 and A.10 display the marginal means using this alternative measure of *Patriarchal* and *Egalitarian* types.

The conjoint results indicate that respondents display some bias against female politicians, but this effect is concentrated among *Patriarchal* types. Regarding issue area, both *Patriarchal* and *Egalitarian* respondents penalize candidates that focus on women's issues at roughly the same rate. The results confirm role congruity theory with regard to candidate gender: there is a preference for male candidates by patriarchal respondents, precisely those respondents who view men as more appropriate for the role of political leadership. The evidence regarding political platforms is more mixed. *Patriarchal* and *Egalitarian* respondents both prefer candidates who appeal to security rather than women's issues (supporting H1), but the respondent gender norms do not moderate the effect. A focus on leadership congruent issues is a more viable political strategy for both male and female candidates across voters with patriarchal and gender egalitarian values.

Candidate Vignette

In the first vignette experiment embedded in the household survey, we examine how female candidates' appeals to different issue areas can affect their levels of voter support. With the vignettes, we explicitly test the hypothesis that women who appeal to gender congruent or leadership congruent issues will be more or less likely to receive voter support. We test the two competing hypotheses predicted by role congruity theory: female candidates who have leadership congruent political platform will increase their voter support (H1) and female candidates who have gender congruent political platform will increase their voter support (H2).

[48] We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. This follows the procedure used in Clayton et al. (2019).

In the online follow-up survey, we compare voters' support for Miriam and a comparable male candidate Ahmed across a control condition and a security condition. This allows us to contrast the effect of a leadership congruent platform by a female candidate with those by a male candidate. In the online survey, each respondent sees one female and one male vignette; the order and platform of each are randomized.[49]

For voter support in both surveys, responses were coded on a five-point scale with those who strongly supported the female candidate coded as a 4 and those who did not support the female candidate at all coded as a 0. The baseline level of support for Miriam was higher among *Egalitarian* respondents compared with *Patriarchal* respondents, giving additional validity to our measure of gender attitudes.

Figure 5(a) displays the average treatment effect (ATE) of political platform on vote choice for the overall sample, as well by *Patriarchal* and *Egalitarian* subgroups (OLS coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals). The security appeal increases support for Miriam by .22 on the five-point scale relative to the control. This represents a 0.18 standard deviation increase in support for Miriam. In support of H1 and contrary to H2, we see that voter support for female candidates is highest when female candidates emphasize security issues — a political strategy that is congruent with stereotypes of strong leadership in Tunisia.[50]

Figure 5(b) shows that this increase in support for Miriam when she appeals to security issues is replicated in the follow-up survey. The security appeal increases support for Miriam by .35 on the five-point scale relative to the control. This represents a 0.32 standard deviation increase in support for Miriam or a 26.7 percent increase relative to the mean. In contrast, the security appeal increases support for Ahmed by .51 on the five-point scale, which represents

[49] In the analysis, we include respondent fixed effects and cluster the errors at the level of the respondent.

[50] As with the conjoint, we subset the sample and run the same analysis only with respondents who stated that economic issues were their main priority. The results hold; female candidates that appeal to security issues are more likely to gain voters' support. Results are displayed in Figure A.8 the Appendix.

a 0.45 standard deviation increase in support. In line with the conjoint results, appealing to a leadership congruent issue increases voter support for both male and female candidates (supporting H1).



(a) Face-to-face survey (BJKA), July 2017



(b) Online survey (YouGov), April 2019

Figure 5: Vignette results

Figure 5 also displays the ATE of political platform on vote choice by respondent type. Figure 5(b) indicates that, while *Egalitarian* respondents support male and female candidates

that appeal to security at the same rates, *Patriarchal* respondents have a stronger preference for male candidates. Thus, they display higher levels of support for male candidates that appeal to security than their *Egalitarian* counterparts. These results provide additional evidence that a respondent's gender norms moderate the effect of candidate gender.

The vignette results demonstrate that *Patriarchal* respondents evaluate female candidates lower than *Egalitarian* respondents but that appeals to security issues can increase voter support for female candidates. The vignettes also indicate, however, that even when female politicians make appeals to security issues, *Patriarchal* respondents still give greater support to male candidates that emphasize the same issues.

Discussion

Following the 2010 overthrow of Ben Ali in Tunisia, electoral gender quotas were established and subsequently strengthened. Despite this significant institutional support and the increased visibility of female politicians in post-revolutionary Tunisia, women remain only one-third of elected MPs and less than 20 percent of municipal mayors (BabNet 2018). Moreover, despite the top-down institutional changes, scholars know little about how constituents view female political leaders in Tunisia and how these women can position themselves to gain electoral support. This is critically important as previous research has shown that an increase in women's descriptive representation leads to an increase in female political engagement and greater investment in women's priorities (Barnes and Burchard 2016; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). To gain analytic leverage on this question, we examine how gender congruent and leadership congruent political platforms affect the electoral support of female politicians.

In our conjoint experiment, we find that there is a significant divide between *Patriarchal* and *Egalitarian* respondents regarding support for female candidates. Among *Patriarchal*

respondents, female candidates are over 7 percentage points less likely to be preferred relative to male candidates. However, there is no discernible difference between *Patriarchal* and *Egalitarian* types with regard to political platform; both *Patriarchal* and *Egalitarian* respondents over 10 percentage points less likely to select candidates who emphasize women's issues as a political priority relative to candidates who focus on security issues.

Using survey vignettes, we show that female candidates whose political platform is leadership congruent are more likely to increase their political support across *Patriarchal* and *Egalitarian* respondents. Notably, appeals to security issues also increased support for male candidates, who *Patriarchal* respondents' already preferred to female candidates. This suggests that, while leadership congruent issues can benefit female candidates, men may benefit more because the issue is *both* leadership and gender congruent. This may be particularly important for those voters who hold stronger gender-based stereotypes.

Linking Patriarchal Gender Norms and Real-World Candidate Priorities

The results of these survey experiments show that voter behavior is shaped by candidate gender and gendered aspects of the candidate's political priorities. Moreover, these effects are moderated by voters' gender norms. Thus, it is natural to ask whether male and female candidates differ substantively in the types of issues that they prioritize or campaign on. While we do not have systematic data on how candidates campaigned in the 2011 and 2014 parliamentary elections, we draw on data from the Local Election Candidate Survey (LECS) to examine differences between municipal election candidates with regard to local political priorities (Blackman et al. 2018; Clark et al. 2018).

Figure 6 shows that, among municipal election candidates, male and female candidates share many of the same political priorities; both men and women prioritize security, trash,

jobs, and roads. Notably, female candidates are *more likely* than their male counterparts to rank security as the top issue facing their municipality. This raises new questions about whether voters simply perceive female candidates to be less focused on security issues even though the candidates may focus on security at similar rates to their male counterparts.

Additionally, our research indicates that male politicians also benefit from making appeals to leadership congruent issues. Accordingly, there may be more competition to work on those portfolios once in government, and political gatekeepers both in government and in the parties may assign that work more to men. For instance, any perceived correlation between candidate gender and candidate priorities may be driven by the different types of gendered issues men and women take on or are assigned once in public office. As Figure 2 illustrates, women are underrepresented on the security and defense parliamentary commission and overrepresented on the women and family commission. Future work should examine how different political parties make decisions about parliamentary committee assignments.

Figure 6: Reported First Local Priority, by candidate gender



Source: Local Election Candidate Survey (LECS) (Blackman et al. 2018; Clark et al. 2018).

Implications for Future Research

In addition to these empirical findings, the contributions of this article are threefold. First, while it is well-documented that women's political representation is low in many countries throughout the world, and notably so in many Middle Eastern countries (Ross 2008), little work outside of the United States and Western Europe has examined how variation in voters' gender attitudes interacts with their support for political candidates and political issues.[51] Additionally, even less comparative work has examined how political platforms interact with candidate gender and voter attitudes. As a result, scholars conducting comparative research

[51]Benstead et al. (2015) is a notable exception but focuses on candidate gender and religiosity rather than political priorities.

in the developing world do not have sufficient experimental evidence to compare and contrast how gender politics operate in these different contexts. Given the recent attention that has been paid to improving institutional support for female candidates in Tunisia, it is important to understand how social norms remain an obstacle to female political representation in the country.

Second, this article highlights how, despite gender quotas, voters' gender norms may create incentives for party leaders to select men as the heads of electoral lists rather than women, particularly in the districts in which they want to be more competitive. Moreover, as discussed above, party leaders may play a role in assigning women to gendered parliamentary committees, perhaps in part because men can also increase their support by appealing to security issues. Future work should further explore how voter biases alter the electoral and parliamentary behavior of party leaders and other political gatekeepers.

Third, our work demonstrates that policy experience focused on women's rights can adversely impact support for that political candidate. Given that more women are serving on parliamentary committees focused on women's issues rather than security and defense, our article suggests that these politicians working on gender issues may not be rewarded politically for that important public service. This research also suggests that female candidates could behave strategically and play up certain aspects of their political experience or platform to gain support. Future work on role congruity in Middle Eastern politics should collect systematic data on how women campaign as a way to understand how female candidates strategically use their own political experience and issue focus to attract voters.

Our study also has several important policy implications regarding the types of strategies women running for political office can adopt and the types of interventions policy practitioners and civil society organizations can implement to improve the electoral chances of female candidates. Importantly, our study demonstrates that voters are more likely to support women as political candidates when they adopt leadership congruent policy platforms.

Similar to Benstead et al. (2015), the results from our study indicate that Tunisian voters base their electoral support on the leadership traits they determine to be historically successful: those associated with men or with security issues. In order to mitigate this bias against women, policy interventions that give voters information on diverse types of political leadership may help transform voters' beliefs about the perceived mismatch between female gender identity, women's issues, and political leadership. In future work, we hope to develop this insight further, examining under what conditions gender congruent behavior can be mobilized as an asset in positions of political leadership and how altering perceptions of what capable leadership is can help alleviate some of the political bias that female candidates face.

Governments too can be more intentional about improving the electability of women. By enforcing electoral gender quotas and increasing the visibility of female political leaders, governments may mitigate political bias against women. Our study also suggests that a critical way for the government to improve the position of female politicians and candidates is to increase the number of opportunities for female politicians to serve in leadership positions in the cabinet and in parliamentary committees, particularly in positions that are not stereotypically associated with women. For instance, appointing women to serve on parliamentary committees focused on security or government corruption may help create a positive association between women and leadership on critical issue areas.

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Supplementary Appendix: Gender Stereotypes, Political Leadership, and Voting Behavior in Tunisia

Alexandra Domike Blackman and Marlette Jackson, September 2019

Contents

1 Details on sampling

1.1 BJKA Survey, 2017

We used multi-stage sampling in order to select the sample for the household survey. First, we selected five governorates using probability of selection proportional to size (PPS) based on the 2014 census.[52] The governorates selected include: Beja, Bizerte, Sfax, Sidi Bouzid, and Sousse. Then, again using PPS based on the 2014 census, we selected two delegations from each of the selected governorates. Both the governorate and the delegation selection was done without replacement.

Next, we used the population size from the 2004 census to select six sectors in each delegation by PPS. We used the 2004 census information because the population size data at the sector level is not publicly available for 2014. The selection of sectors was done with replacement.[53] For each sector selected, we surveyed 20 respondents in that sector. If a sector was selected twice, we interviewed 40 respondents and so on.

The enumerators were then sent to a central point within each sector and asked to select the first house based on the date of the interview. The enumerators were instructed to walk from the central point along a road, selecting only households on the left side of the road. After selecting the first household, the enumerators were instructed to select subsequent households by skipping five households between the prior household and the next household in urban areas and by skipping three households in rural areas. Thirty households were selected in this manner for each set of twenty respondents required (20 main sample and 10 replacements in case of refusals). Three attempts were made at each selected household until 20 respondents were completed.

Once a household agreed to participate, enumerators used a Kish grid to select a respondent from the eligible individuals in the household. Enumerators alternated selecting from among the females of the household and the males of the household to ensure a gender-

[52] Governorates that are part of what was historically considered the Southern regions (Gabes, Gafsa, Kebili, Medenine, Tataouine, and Tozeur) were excluded from the sampling because of another section of the survey that examines the relationship between historical and contemporary patterns of governance and property rights in the non-Southern governorates.

[53] These sectors vary with regard to their categorization as rural or urban, as well as with regard to their population size. Of the 105 sectors included in our 10 delegations, roughly 40 percent are categorized as urban. The population size of these 105 sectors ranges from 603 (Takrouna sector in Sousse) to 26,195 (El Ain sector in Sfax). By sampling with replacement, we are able to address two issues, one logistical and one concerning the representativeness of the sample. First, we are able to increase the likelihood that we are sampling in an area where face-to-face interviews are feasible through a random walk from a central point in the sector. In some very remote areas with low population density, this would not be possible. Second, by sampling the sectors with replacement, we are more likely to select higher population sectors, which also tend to be urban. With replacement, we selected 23 urban sectors of 43 total sectors (53.5 percent), with a total of 680 respondents of 1200 total respondents (56.7 percent) coming from urban sectors. Without replacement, we selected only 27 urban sectors of 58 total sectors (46.5 percent), with 580 of 1200 total respondents (48.3 percent) coming from urban areas. In 2015, the urban population in Tunisia was estimated at approximately 67 percent of the population. Accordingly, while our sample still oversamples from rural areas, selecting sectors with replacement makes the sample more representative with regard to the level of urbanization.

balanced sample. All potential male or female respondents (had to be over 18) in a household were listed from youngest to oldest in the Kish grid, and one was selected based on the date. Enumerators collected the data using Qualtrics on tablets. The survey was conducted from July 7, 2017 until July 20, 2017. See Table A.4 for further details on the respondents' demographics.

1.2 YouGov Survey, 2019

The YouGov survey was conducted online with the YouGov Tunisia panel. The survey was conducted from April 15, 2019 until April 22, 2019. The respondents are more educated, younger, and are more likely to be employed than the overall population. See Table A.4 for further details on the respondents' demographics.

2 Survey experiment design

2.1 Survey Vignettes

Control:
In June 2016[54], the Tunisian government passed a law requiring a quota for the number of women who occupy political positions. As part of this new quota, a new candidate, [Miriam/Ahmed] will be running for a local council position in a neighboring district for the [upcoming] elections. [Miriam/Ahmed] has been engaging with community members in her district at local community meetings. At the last meeting, [Miriam/Ahmed] said, **"I received an education at Universite de Tunis El Manar.** I think you should vote for me in the upcoming election, and give me a chance to lead our district."

Security:
In June 2016, the Tunisian government passed a law requiring a quota for the number of women who occupy political positions. As part of this new quota, a new candidate, [Miriam/Ahmed] will be running for a local council position in a neighboring district for the [upcoming] elections. [Miriam/Ahmed] has been engaging with community members in her district at local community meetings. At the last meeting, [Miriam/Ahmed] said, **"Not only have I received an education at Universite de Tunis El Manar, but I have worked with local security forces to lower crime in our area. I am committed to fighting crime and making our country more secure.** I think you should vote for me in the upcoming election, and give me a chance to lead our district."

Women's Rights:
In June 2016, the Tunisian government passed a law requiring a quota for the number of women who occupy political positions. As part of this new quota, a new candidate, Miriam

[54]This date refers to when the new electoral law for the municipal elections was passed.

will be running for a local council position in a neighboring district for the [upcoming] elections. Miriam has been engaging with community members in her district at local community meetings. At the last meeting, Miriam said, **"Not only have I received an education at Universite de Tunis El Manar, but I worked with a civil society organization that focuses on promoting women's rights. I am committed to supporting women in the workforce and giving them a voice in the government.** I think you should vote for me in the upcoming election, and give me a chance to lead our district."

Traditionalism:
In June 2016, the Tunisian government passed a law requiring a quota for the number of women who occupy political positions. As part of this new quota, a new candidate, Miriam will be running for a local council position in a neighboring district for the [upcoming] elections. Miriam has been engaging with community members in her district at local community meetings. At the last meeting, Miriam said, **"Not only have I received an education at Universite de Tunis El Manar, but I have worked with a local Islamic charity organization in my hometown. I am committed to preserving our Islamic history and local traditions while serving the community here.** I think you should vote for me in the upcoming election, and give me a chance to lead our district."

3 Additional figures and tables

3.1 Women in Parliament

Figure A.1 displays the percentage of female MPs in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia from 1997 until 2017.

Figure A.1: Percentage of women MPs, 1997-2017



Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (2018).

Figure A.2 displays the percentage of all female MPs [or of all male MPs] that have a given professional background (Marsad Majles 2019).

Figure A.2: Distribution of professions by gender



Figure A.3: Conjoint survey design

الحكومة التونسية تخطط باش تعمل انتخابات المجالس المحلية عن قريب. المجالس المحلية هاذي باش تقرر جدول أعمال التنمية الاجتماعية والاقتصادية في منطقتك.

توا باش نطلبو منك تتمعن في زوز مترشحين، المترشح "1" والمترشح "2". كان تسمح تتفضل تقرى الجدول بإمعان، ثم تقرر شكون المترشح اللي تفضلو في انتخابات المجالس المحلية الجاية. [إذا كان المستبين غير قادر على القراءة، يرجى قراءة صفات المترشح لهم.] باش نطلب منك تقارن أربعة مجموعات من المترشحين.

	المترشح 1	**المترشح 2**
المدينة الأصلية	على بعد 40 كم من هنا	على بعد 20 كم من هنا
العمر	60	40
الخبرة السياسية السابقة	قد عمل سابقا في الحكومة	لم يعمل سابقا في الحكومة
الانتماء الحزبي	حراك تونس الإرادة	التيار الديمقراطي
الجنس	أنثى	أنثى
المستوى التعليمي	درس/ت بالخارج	البكالوريا
أولوية المترشح السياسية	مكافحة الفساد	تحسين الوضع الاقتصادي
المهنة	ناشط/ة سياسي	أستاذ/ة

3.2 Survey Demographics

Table A.4: Demographic characteristics of the survey sample

Survey	YouGov	BJKA	Arab Barometer	Afrobarometer
Year	2019	2017	2016	2015
Gender				
Male	50	51.6	50	50
Female	50	48.4	50	50
Age				
18 to 29	37.1	25.0	21.5	19.3
30 to 39	25.1	23.7	21.6	23.2
40 and older	37.8	51.3	56.9	57.5
Education				
None	1.0	13.7	16.3	17.2
Elementary/Preparatory	1.6	37.5	37.6	36.2
Secondary	14.1	30.0	28.0	24.9
Post-secondary	83.3	18.7	18.1	21.7
Employment				
Yes (Full-and part-time)	63.1	34.3	36.2	38.9
No (in and out of labor force)	36.9	65.7	63.8	61.1
Conjoint Response				
Always	100.0	33.1		
Sometimes	–	28.1		
Never	–	38.7		
Egalitarian/Patriarchal?				
Egalitarian	69.3	57.9		
Patriarchal	30.7	42.1		

The surveys categorize education in different ways. In the BJKA survey and the Arab Barometer survey, we combine Elementary and Preparatory levels into one category and BA and Above BA into "Post-secondary." In the Afrobarometer and YouGov surveys, we combine all post-secondary qualifications into "Post-secondary." Urban/rural data is not available for YouGov respondents, but nearly all are based in cities.

3.3 Experimental Analyses

Figure A.5: Marginal means & difference (all variables) — Face-to-face survey (BJKA), July 2017



Note: 95 percent confidence intervals displayed.

Figure A.6: Marginal means & difference (all variables) — Online survey (YouGov), April 2019



Note: 95 percent confidence intervals displayed.

Figure A.7: Marginal means & difference (all variables) — Economic Issue Respondents (BJKA), July 2017



Note: 95 percent confidence intervals displayed.

Figure A.8: Vignette results — Economic Issue Respondents (BJKA), July 2017



Note: 95 percent confidence intervals displayed.

Figure A.9: Marginal means & difference (residuals measure) — Face-to-face survey (BJKA), July 2017



Note: 95 percent confidence intervals displayed.

Figure A.10: Marginal means & difference (residuals measure) — Online survey (YouGov), April 2019



Note: 95 percent confidence intervals displayed.